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In the last decade a major change in the development of ﬁrms is that they
have become more human capital oriented. Especially the new economy ﬁrm
attracts talented employees in order to create comparative advantages. Physical
assets have become less unique and are not commanding large rents anymore.
Increased competition with many independent suppliers has increased demand for
quality improvement, which can only be generated by talented employees. The
implication is that new ﬁrms tend to be non-vertically integrated, human-capital-
incentive organizations that operate in a highly competitive environment (Zingales
(2000), Journal of Finance).
This paper analyzes this ﬁrm in the setting of ”the dynamic theory of the ﬁrm”.
Human capital is the central state variable, and a framework is designed in which
path dependency is accounted for. Optimal long run policies are determined,
and it turns out that a quality trap exists, implying that, in order to be able to
remain active in the long run, the ﬁrm’s initial amount of human capital should
be suﬃciently large as we see in reality: if this amount is too small the ﬁrm will
cease its operations in the long run and go bankrupt. Mathematically speaking:
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a multiple equilibria solution arises where the Skiba point separates success and
failure.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade the determinants of ﬁrm performance have changed considerably (Zin-
gales (2000)). First, physical assets, which used to be the major source of rents, have
become less unique, and thus do not automatically lead to large ﬁrm returns. Some
reasons for this change are the easier access to ﬁnancing due to the improvement of
capital markets, and the drop in communication costs, which reduced the importance of
expensive distribution channels, which in turn favors the access to the market of newly
formed companies. Second, growing internationalization has increased interdependen-
cies among ﬁrms. Former domestic market leaders now have to deal with competition.
This has increased the demand for quality improvement which can only be generated
by talented employees, implying an increased importance of human capital. For the
ﬁrm human capital is a strategic asset, because it belongs to ”the set of diﬃcult to
trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable, and specialized resources and capabilities that
bestow the ﬁrm’s competitive advantage” (Amit and Shoemaker (1993, p. 36)). Dur-
ing the last decade ﬁrms, and especially new economy ﬁrms, have thus become human
capital-intensive organizations directed at innovation and quality improvement.
This paper belongs to the dynamic theory of the ﬁrm. Within the theory of the
ﬁrm four streams can be identiﬁed which are (i) the ﬁrst theoretical reﬂections (Gordon
(1962), Marris (1964), Penrose (1959)) concerning the relation between the most impor-
tant elements as dividends and proﬁts, the value of the ﬁrm and the growth rate, (ii)
the simulation models where the performance of the ﬁrm (proﬁt, cash ﬂow, investment
level) is calculated using models with many equations (Burril and Quinto (1972)), (iii)
the capital accumulation models, in which optimal control theory is applied to develop
and analyze ﬁrm investment behavior, taking into account the relation between debt
and equity, investment and dividend (Lesourne (1973), Van Hilten et al. (1993)), and
(iv) partial models in the areas of ﬁnance (Jarrow et al. (1995)), marketing (Eliashberg
and Lilien (1993)) and organization (Burton and Obel (1995)).
The implication of these developments for the existing theories of the ﬁrm is that
they analyze the traditional economy, but they seem to be quite ineﬀective in helping us
cope with the new type of ﬁrms that is emerging (Zingales (2000)). Therefore, this paper3
focusses on investment in highly qualiﬁed human capital as a means to increase the ﬁrm’s
performance. As already recognized in the literature (e.g. Becker and Gerhart (1996)),
two of the key factors in the development of human resources within organizations are
causal ambiguity and path dependency. Especially the latter characteristic requires a
dynamic approach in order to design a framework in which the development of human
capital within a ﬁrm can be meaningfully analyzed. Therefore, we develop a dynamic
model of the ﬁrm in which the central state variable represents the ﬁrm’s human capital
relative to some baseline level, thus taking into account that human capital is increasing
also for the ﬁrm’s competitors. Using an optimal control model we analyze optimal ﬁrm
behavior regarding investments in human capital.
It turns out that a quality trap exists in the sense that if the initial level of (re-
sources to attract) human capital is low it is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to attract human
capital. Therefore the ﬁrm will lose market share and this will lead to ceasing the ﬁrm’s
operations in the long run. If the initial level of human capital is suﬃciently large the
ﬁrm will invest in human capital. These investments are continuous over time and in
the long run the ﬁrm enters a unique steady state where human capital (realtive to its
baseline level) is constant, and marginal revenue of human capital investments equals
marginal investment costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a formulation of the model,
which is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Formulation
For modern corporations human capital is emerging as the most crucial asset (Zingales
(2000)). The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for human capital
investments. As argued by Dulbecco and Garrouste (2000), to develop the new theory of
the ﬁrm ”it is necessary to take into account the processual dimension of both production
and knowledge in order to analyze as a process the coordination of the ﬁrm’s plans.” To
do so we formulate a dynamic model of the ﬁrm in which the state variable is human
capital (H) relative to some baseline level. The greater H, the more eﬃcient the ﬁrm can
produce, or, alternatively, the higher the quality of its products (relative to the product
quality level of its competitors) will be, and the more attractive it is to customers. H
can be increased by attracting promising human beings. This we call human capital
investments which we denote by I. However, if the ﬁrm refrains from human capital
investments, its relative standing, which is what H stands for, will tend to decline. It4
is assumed that human capital of the ﬁrm’s competitors grows with rate δ (δ>0a n d




= I(t) − δH(t),H(0) = H0 ≥ 0. (1)
Equation (1) indicates that the relative advantage of a ﬁrm increases with attracting
human capital, but it reduces through human capital growth in other ﬁrms. The latter
is taken exogenous in our model although it is assumed here that this growth is pro-
portional to the own ﬁrm’s human capital, which in a sense reﬂects the ”the dialectics
of progress”. In general human capital growth will diﬀer among competitors. There-
fore, the constant δ should be seen as a kind of weighted average that represents its
competitive environment with regard to technological progress.
A straightforward inequality is
H ≥ 0. (2)
Deﬁne proﬁt (π) as the diﬀerence between revenue obtained from selling output on the
market and variable production costs. An increase of human capital enables the ﬁrm to
increase its proﬁt, because if, relative to its competitors, increasing human capital leads
to more eﬃcient production its proﬁt margin increases and/or it produces more goods.
Alternatively, if increased human capital generates the production of higher quality
goods, the ﬁrm can increase its output price. We conclude that proﬁt is increasing in
human capital, so that π = π(H) with π￿ > 0. To determine the second order derivative
of π(H) it should be realized that it is easier to raise proﬁt when human capital is
still low, where the occurrence of synergetic eﬀects could even lead to increasing returns
to scale, but it becomes more diﬃcult if human capital is already large. Making an
already very eﬃcient production process even more eﬃcient, or increasing the quality
of a high quality product, requires advanced R&D activities (see also Das and Van de
Ven (2000)). Taking these arguments into account we impose that
π”(H) ≥ 0f o rH ≤ ˆ H, (3)
π”(H) < 0f o rH>ˆ H.
results in a convex-concave shape of π(H)w h e r eπ” ≥ 0f o rH ≤ ˆ H, while π” < 0f o r
H>ˆ H.1
1Notice that in microeconomics the assumption of a proﬁt function having this shape is quite common
(see, e.g., Kreps (1990), p. 256).5
In order to raise human capital with I the ﬁrm needs to incur adjustment costs
given by C(I). Concerning these adjustment costs we can think for instance about costs
of moving, job advertising, tempting promising people to join the ﬁrm in the form of
oﬀering option arrangements, schooling new employees, and so on and so forth. In case
human capital declines because people leave the organization, thus I<0, no adjustment
costs are generated. It holds that C￿ > 0a n dC” > 0f o rI ≥ 0, and C (I)=0f o rI ≤ 0.
This implies that C (I) has a kink for I = 0, i.e. it holds that C￿ (0−)=0<C ￿(0+).
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the discounted cash ﬂow stream. One interpreta-
tion is that earnings that are not used for investments are paid out as beneﬁts to the
specialists that are employed within the ﬁrm. The objective of the ﬁrm is to maximize
this beneﬁt stream over an inﬁnite planning period, discounted with rate r (r>0a n d
constant). Hence, the specialists maximize their wealth: they receive the end-of-the-
year-beneﬁts. An alternative explanation is that the earnings are paid out as dividends
to the shareholders. It is in the interest of the ﬁrm’s specialists to increase dividends
because of the positive inﬂuence of the dividends on the value of the stocks, which in-







−rt[π(H (t)) − C (I (t))]dt. (4)
The optimal control model is now given by (1), (2) and (4). The ﬁrm has to attract
human capital in such a way, that the resulting values for I(t)a n dH(t) maximize (4),
while taking into account the constraint (2).
To limit the possible scenarios we focus on the case where
π
￿ (0) < (r + δ)C
￿ (0). (5)
This means that for human capital equal to zero marginal proﬁts are that low
that they fall below marginal cost of human capital investment2.The implication of this
assumption is that for suﬃciently low initial values of human capital it does not pay to
increase human capital by performing human capital investments.
2The validity of this assumption is exempliﬁed by the following story. According to the Tilburg
University newspaper Univers (November 30, 2000) the Dutch government was only willing to subsidize
the founding of the economic research institute CentERin 1987, in case Tilburg University itself would
ﬁrst attract at least three distinguished researchers.6
3 Analysis of the Model
In order to shorten notation, we omit from now on, when no confusion can arise, the
time argument t. To ﬁnd the optimal solution we start out by deriving the necessary
optimality conditions provided by Pontryagin’s maximumprinciple (see, e.g., Feichtinger
and Hartl (1986)). The current value Hamiltonian (H)i s
H = π(H) − C (I)+λ(I − δH),
where λ is the co-state variable representing a dynamic shadowprice of human capital.
To take also into account the constraint (2) we state the Lagrangian:
L = H + νH,
where ν is the Lagrange parameter corresponding to the constraint (2). Then the
necessary optimality conditions are
λ = C
￿(I)f o rI>0, (6)
˙ λ =( r + δ)λ − π
￿(H)+ν, (7)
νH =0 ,ν≥ 0. (8)
No adjustment costs are incurred when I ≤ 0. Therefore, as long as an additional unit
of human capital has enough value to the ﬁrm, i.e. λ>C ￿(0+), investments will be
positive, otherwise the ﬁrm refrains from attracting human capital.
3.1 Feasible steady states
To ﬁnd feasible steady states we consider the interior of the feasible region, so that we
put the Lagrange multiplier ν equal to zero. Then it is obtained from (6) and (7) that







The dynamic system governing the dynamics of the model is given by (1) and (9).
The ˙ H = 0-isocline thus equals the straight line I = δH.F o r t h e˙ I =0 −isocline it
















Since the ˙ H = 0-isocline is monotonically increasing and the ˙ I =0 −isocline ﬁrst
increases and then decreases, at most two feasible steady states exist. Straightforward
calculations (see, e.g., Feichtinger and Hartl (1986)) show that the larger steady state,
denoted by H2, is a saddle point, which implies that it can be a long run equilibrium,
while the lower steady state (H1) is unstable.
In case the larger steady state does not exist for a positive human capital level, it
can be shown that the ﬁrm will always cease its operations in the long run (cf. Hartl
and Kort (2000)). Since this is economically less interesting, we choose to disregard this
case here. Hence, in what follows we only consider the case where (at least) the larger
steady state exists for a positive human capital level. Due to (5) this implies that both












Together with (5) this relation indicates that it is only worthwhile for the ﬁrm to
invest in human capital if marginal proﬁt is suﬃciently large (see also the next section),
that is, if marginal proﬁts of the human capital increase exceeds the marginal cost of
human capital investment.
If (11) does not hold, it follows that the larger steady state does not exist for a
positive human capital level. What happens in this case is that the ﬁrm will reduce
human capital investments, leading to a decline in human capital. The implication is
that eventually competitors will drive this ﬁrm out of the market
3.2 The optimal trajectories
The information obtained in the previous subsection is used here to present the ﬁrm’s
optimal trajectories in a phase diagram, which is depicted in Figure 1. Due to assump-
tion (5) it holds that for suﬃciently low initial values of human capital it does not pay to
perform human capital investments. Here marginal proﬁts are even that low that they
fall below marginal cost of human capital investment. The implication is the occurrence
of a Skiba point (cf. Dechert (1983), Dechert and Nishimura (1983)) HS,t ot h el e f to f
which the ﬁrm converges to the point (0,0) where it ceases its operations. Hence, the
ﬁrm enters this trajectory when H(0) <H S. This trajectory acknowledges the existence
3When the inequality in (5) is reversed, it holds that only the larger steady state (and not the
smaller one) lies in the ﬁrst quadrant. This larger steady state is then a unique long run equilibrium
to which the optimal trajectories of the ﬁrm converge.8
of a ’quality trap’, thus that a suﬃciently high amount of initial quality is needed for
the ﬁrm in order to survive in the long run.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
To the right of the Skiba point HS it is again worthwhile for the ﬁrm to invest in
human capital. We distinguish two starting points of the ﬁrm: one where the initial
human capital level lies between the Skiba point HS and the long run steady state
level H2 (see Figure 1) and one where the initial human capital level exceeds H2.F o r
the trajectory with relatively low initial human capital level, given by H (0) = H0L ∈
(HS,H 2), it holds that investments ﬁrst increase and then decrease over time. Next, we
provide the economic intuition for this optimal trajectory.





￿ (H (s))ds − C
￿ (I (t)) = 0. (12)
Equation (12) represents the net present value of marginal investment (NPVMI, see
Van Hilten et al. (1993)), which is thus zero. The NPVMI consists of the total cashﬂow
caused by an additional unit of human capital investment at time t and consists of
two terms. The ﬁrst term contains the proﬁt stream resulting from the marginal human
capital investment at time t. This term is corrected for discounting and depreciation.The
second term is the initial investment outlay including the adjustment costs.
The trajectory approaches the long run stationary equilibrium H2 at which the
marginal proﬁts equals marginal cost, while human capital is kept at the same level:
π
￿(H2)=( r + δ)C
￿(δH2). (13)
Next let us turn to the solution where the initial human capital is high, thus where
H(0) = H0H >H 2. Since we are on the concave part of the proﬁt function, the proﬁt
increase due to an extra unit of human capital is low. This makes that initial investments
are low. It can even be the case that it is not optimal to start out with human capital





￿ (H (s))ds − C
￿ (0) < 0. (14)
Hence, the ﬁrm refrains from attracting new personnel since the immediate investment
costs exceed the discounted extra proﬁts implied by the human capital increase. The
implication is that human capital starts to decrease. Then after a while human capital9
is suﬃciently low, and thus the marginal proﬁt increase suﬃciently high, to make it
worthwhile to start up human capital investments. At this point the trajectory enters
the saddle point path where the NPVMI equals zero. From this moment on the re-
maining part of the trajectory resembles the previous one with the diﬀerence that now
investments increase on the saddle point path while human capital is decreasing all the
way.
By now it is clear that the Skiba point separates the regions of the initial values of human
capital that determine the long run viability of the ﬁrm. It is therefore worthwhile to
investigate how the location of the Skiba point reacts to changes of the model parameters.
From (9) it is obtained that the unstable state satisﬁes
π
￿(H1)=( r + δ)C
￿(δH1). (15)
As indicated by several contributions in the ”Skiba point literature” (e.g. Ladron-De-
Guevara et al. (1999)), the location of the unstable equilibrium does not coincide with
the Skiba point although they are located ”near” to each other. However, in what
follows we implicitly assume that the Skiba point will react to changes in the model
parameters in the same way as the unstable steady state does (moreover, unlike of what
is known from the existing literature, recently Hartl et al. (2001) showed that situations
exist where policy functions are continuous and the Skiba point is the unstable steady
state itself). From (15) and remembering that the Skiba point occurs in the interval of
H-values where the output price is a convexly increasing function of human capital, it
is obtained that the Skiba point moves to the right in case the discount rate (r), the
growth in human capital of other ﬁrms (δ), and the marginal adjustment costs of human
capital investments increase in value. The economic implication is that the viability of
new economy ﬁrms reduces. This leads to the conclusion that on a stock exchange
with many new economy ﬁrms an increase of the discount rate does not only result
in the usual negative eﬀect on the stockprices but this usual eﬀect is strengthened by
the upward shift of the Skiba point. That is, the domain for initial levels of human
capital for which it is optimal to seize operations in the long run, and thus leading to
bankruptcy, increases.
4 Conclusions
This paper deals with the incentive to invest in human capital. Since human capital
has long run implications for the ﬁrm, a dynamic framework has to be considered. A10
large amount of human capital implies that very talented employees are working for
this ﬁrm, and they are able to generate product and process innovations leading to
higher proﬁts (Zingales (2000)). Here it is reasonable to assume that increased human
capital especially raises proﬁts when human capital is still low, since then there is much
room for improvement. However, on the other hand extra human capital does not lead
to signiﬁcantly more proﬁts if the human capital level is already high, since it is very
diﬃcult to improve an already eﬃciently operating organization. These features are
incorporated in a dynamic model of the ﬁrm, where the objective is to maximize the
discounted cash ﬂow stream over the planning period. At each point in time the ﬁrm has
to decide how much eﬀorts it has to make in order to raise human capital. These eﬀorts,
which in the paper are denoted by human capital investments, generate adjustment
costs in the sense of job advertising, schooling, option arrangements, etc.
It turns out that the ﬁrm ﬁxes the human capital investments such that the net
present value of marginal investment is zero, indicating that an extra unit of investment
generates a cash inﬂow that exactly equals the immediate cash outﬂow. In the same
fashion, the ﬁrm refrains from undertaking human capital investments at the moment
that the net present value of marginal investment is negative. If the initial level of
human capital is suﬃciently large, it is always optimal for the ﬁrm to keep on producing
during the whole planning period. Investments are continuous over time, and eventually
a steady state is reached where marginal proﬁts of human capital investments equals
marginal costs.. If the initial human capital level is small, it turns out to be optimal to
reduce human capital and stop production in ﬁnite time.
In conclusion, this paper applies optimal control theory and the insights gained
from the ”Skiba point literature” (Dechert (1983), Ladron-De-Guevara et al. (1999))
to the human capital investment decision. This is an important topic since recently
increased competition at the worldwide level has raised the demand for process inno-
vation and quality improvement, which can only be generated by talented employees.
Thus, the quest for more innovation increases the importance of human capital. In this
paper it is shown that our setting leads to clear economic conclusions. It is our belief
that the methodological approach taken in this paper could be a starting point for the
development of a solid theoretical foundation concerning the new economy ﬁrm and its
human capital.
Another interesting topic for future research would be to endogenize the competitive
environment with regard to technological progress. In the analysis of the present paper
this is represented by a constant δ. However, in reality this δ will diﬀer among ﬁrms, its11
value will change over time, and strategic behavior will exist in the sense that ﬁrms will
design their investment policy taking into account its inﬂuence on the competitors’δ’s.
However, it has to be remarked that incorporating elements like this into a fully dynamic
framework like our model, will complicate the analysis considerably.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Optimal trajectories of the ﬁrm.14